Iran Update, April 18, 2024

Kathryn Tyson, Amin Soltani, Ashka Jhaveri, Peter Mills, Alexandra Braverman, Kelly Campa, Johanna Moore, Andie Parry, and Brian Carter

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate with one another to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Iran is likely engaging in a coordinated information effort to deter an Israeli strike targeting its nuclear facilities and reassure its domestic population about Iran’s ability to protect such facilities. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Nuclear Security and Protection Corps Commander Brigadier General Ahmad Haghtalab announced on April 18 that Iran will change its publicly stated “nuclear doctrine and policies” in the event of an Israeli strike targeting its nuclear facilities.[1] Haghtalab also said that the Iranian National Passive Defense Organization—one of the regime bodies responsible for defending its civilian, military, and nuclear infrastructure from attacks—has plans in place to face “any threat from” Israel.[2] The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) evacuated its inspectors from Iranian nuclear facilities on April 16. The IAEA cited concerns that Israel might strike Iranian nuclear facilities in response to Iran’s April 13 drone and missile strikes targeting Israel.[3]

Most of Iran’s official state media apparatus, including media outlets controlled by the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC)—the main regime body overseeing Iranian nuclear policy—highlighted Haghtalab’s announcement.[4] This reporting suggests that officials at the highest levels of the Iranian government endorsed the announcement, including the SNSC and the Office of the Supreme Leader. Western officials and analysts have often expressed concern that a US or Israeli strike targeting Iran’s nuclear facilities would spur Iran to renew its nuclear weapons program.[5] Iran is likely seeking to exploit this long-standing concern to influence Israeli calculations. Iran is also likely seeking to exploit this concern to influence Western governments to place pressure on Israel not to strike Iran’s nuclear program. The Iranian regime has also long touted its nuclear program as a significant national achievement and probably seeks to reassure its population that it will protect its nuclear accomplishments.[6]

Iran’s attempt to deter an Israeli retaliatory strike does not mean that Iran will not pursue nuclear weapons development, however. Iranian officials have long said that Iran will not weaponize its nuclear program, citing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s 2003 fatwa outlawing nuclear weapons.[7] Haghtalab’s announcement contradicts Khamenei’s stated opposition to nuclear weapons development and marks a notable departure from previous regime rhetoric with respect to its nuclear policies. CTP-ISW previously assessed in December 2023 that Iran has pursued a series of nuclear advancements consistent with the desire for a nuclear arsenal.[8] The announcement also coincides with several senior Iranian officials, including IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami, expressing that the recent escalation cycle between Iran and Israel has significantly altered Iran’s external security calculus in an unspecified manner.[9]

Houthi leader Abdulmalik al Houthi claimed on April 18 that the Houthi attacks on commercial shipping have extended “from the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean.”[10] The Houthis claimed on April 7 that they conducted two attacks targeting two commercial ships in the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea.[11] CTP-ISW cannot confirm that these attacks occurred and did not observe any reporting that corroborated the Houthi claims. The Houthis have said on multiple occasions that its maritime attack campaign aims to blockade Israel to support the Palestinian people.[12] The Houthis have expressed an aspiration to expand their attacks targeting Israeli shipping in the Indian Ocean and around the Cape of Good Hope.[13] The Houthis do not yet have this capability, but such a capability would allow the Houthis to attack alternate shipping routes that bypass the Red Sea. These attacks have forced major shipping companies to avoid the Red Sea and instead go around the Cape of Good Hope, which imposes additional time delays and costs on trade between Europe and Asia.[14] Houthi attacks have had limited success in “blockading” the Israeli port of Eilat on the Red Sea. Eilat’s revenue decreased by 80% between November 2023 and December 2023.[15]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: Iran is likely engaging in a coordinated information effort to deter an Israeli strike targeting its nuclear facilities and reassure its domestic population about Iran’s ability to protect such facilities.
• An unnamed senior US official told ABC News that Israel is unlikely to retaliate against Iran until after the Passover holiday.
• Yemen: Houthi leader Abdulmalik al Houthi claimed that the Houthi attacks on commercial shipping have extended “from the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean.”
• Northern Gaza Strip: The IDF Air Force struck Palestinian fighters and military infrastructure in the northern Gaza Strip.
• Central Gaza Strip: The IDF concluded a week-long operation targeting Palestinian fighters and military infrastructure near Nuseirat in the central Gaza Strip.
• Political Negotiations: Hamas Deputy Political Bureau head Musa Abu Marzouk said that Hamas will not withdraw from ceasefire negotiations or drop its maximalist demands, which include a permanent ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.
• West Bank: Israeli forces engaged Palestinian fighters in at least two locations in the West Bank.
• Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least nine attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
• Iraq: The Iraqi government and private sector signed 14 memoranda of understanding (MOU), primarily in energy and finance, with US companies.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Air Force struck Palestinian fighters and military infrastructure in the northern Gaza Strip on April 18. The IDF Air Force struck a militia mortar position in Rimal neighborhood in western Gaza City that Palestinian fighters used to shell Israeli forces.[16] The IDF Air Force separately conducted an airstrike over the past week that killed a Hamas operative in the groups’ internal security apparatus in Beit Hanoun.[17] The Hamas-controlled Interior Ministry's Internal Security Forces in the Gaza Strip employs fighters from the Hamas military wing.[18] CTP-ISW assessed on March 25 that a small number of Palestinian fighters have likely infiltrated Beit Hanoun.[19] Israeli forces recently conducted raids targeting Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) sites in Beit Hanoun.[20]

Palestinian militias conducted several attacks targeting Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip on April 18. Hamas and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah and aligned with Hamas in the war, conducted separate mortar attacks targeting Israeli forces near the Netzarim corridor in eastern Gaza City, where Israeli forces have constructed a highway to support military operations.[21] Hamas fighters detonated two explosively-rigged tunnels and mines targeting Israeli infantry and vehicles in Mughraqa in southern Gaza City.[22]

The National Resistance Brigades and al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades conducted a combined mortar attack targeting a military site in the central Gaza Strip along the Israeli-Gaza Strip border in on April 18.[23]

The IDF concluded a week-long operation targeting Palestinian fighters and military infrastructure near Nuseirat in the central Gaza Strip on April 18.[24] The IDF announced on April 11 that several of its units, including the Nahal Brigade (162nd Division), were operating outside of Nuseirat. Israeli forces killed over 40 Palestinian fighters and destroyed over 100 military infrastructure sites during the operation, including tunnels and Hamas and PIJ rocket production sites.[25] Israeli forces raided a militia headquarters that was designed to deny Israeli forces access to the central Gaza Strip by crossing Wadi Gaza. CTP-ISW previously observed that Palestinian militias, including Hamas, have likely used a rear area in the central Gaza Strip to conduct attacks since mid-December that have targeted Israeli forces in the northern Gaza Strip. Palestinian militias have also likely been able to infiltrate from the central Strip into previously cleared areas of southern Gaza City. The IDF said that the Nuseirat operation expanded the Netzarim corridor. The IDF is withdrawing the Nahal Brigade from the Gaza Strip to prepare it for future operations, including in Rafah and the central Gaza Strip. A reserve brigade will backfill the IDF Nahal Brigade in the corridor.[26]

The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades mortared Israeli forces in eastern Khan Younis in the southern Gaza Strip on April 18.[27]

The IDF conducted several airstrikes targeting Palestinian fighters in the Gaza Strip on April 18. The IDF and the Shin Bet coordinated with the 215th Artillery Brigade (162nd Division) to strike ten Palestinian fighters inside in an unspecified area in the Gaza Strip.[28] The IDF Air Force also struck dozens of targets throughout the Gaza Strip, including observation posts and Palestinian fighters.[29]

US officials told Axios on April 18 that US President Joe Biden had not approved a military operation into Rafah in return for Israel restraining from conducting a military operation against Iran, contradicting earlier reports.[30] An unspecified senior Western diplomat told UK-based and Qatari-privately owned al Araby al Jadeed that Biden had approved the operation in exchange for Israel declining to strike Iran in retaliation for Iran’s April 13 drone and missile attack on Israel.[31]

The US officials separately noted that US and Israeli officials will meet virtually on April 18 to discuss a possible Israeli military operation into Rafah.[32] The officials noted that an Israeli working group presented a “gradual, slow operation in specific neighborhoods of Rafah in order to evacuate” civilians.[33]

Hamas Deputy Political Bureau head Musa Abu Marzouk said on April 18 that Hamas will not withdraw from ceasefire negotiations or drop its maximalist demands, which include a permanent ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.[34] Marzouk added that Hamas does not know how many Israeli hostages are dead or alive.[35] Hamas rejected the latest US-proposed ceasefire and hostage-for-prisoner exchange deal on April 13, just hours before the Iranian drone and missile attack on Israel.[36] Hamas has since demanded new concessions from Israel in its counteroffer, according to one Israeli official.[37] The official said that Hamas sought to release fewer Israeli hostages in addition to asking for a higher ratio of hostage-for-prisoners and for Israel to release more Palestinian prisoners held under a life sentence.[38]

The World Food Programme (WFP) delivered aid via the Erez crossing on the northern Gaza Strip border for the first time since the war began.[39] WFP confirmed that three convoys with enough food and wheat flour for nearly 80,000 people crossed into the northern strip on April 18.[40] The Israeli War Cabinet approved the reopening of its Erez crossing with the northern Gaza Strip on April 5, which has been closed since the beginning of the war.[41]

PIJ conducted two rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip targeting southern Israel on April 18.[42]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least two locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on April 17.[43] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades engaged Israeli forces with small arms and detonated an improvised explosive device targeting an IDF vehicle in the Nour Shams refugee camp in Tulkarm on April 18.[44] Palestinian media reported that Lions‘ Den fighters targeted Israeli forces with small arms at an Israeli checkpoint in Nablus on April 17.[45] The Lions’ Den—a West Bank militia based in Nablus that has built a large social media following—had not claimed an attack targeting Israeli forces since October 23, 2023 and had been inactive on Telegram.[46] Pro-Hamas media published several references to the Lions‘ Den on April 13 amid reports of Israeli settlers committing acts of violence in at least eight Palestinian towns in the northern West Bank.[47]

Israeli police detained a Palestinian reportedly affiliated with ISIS during an overnight operation near Ramallah. The reportedly ISIS-affiliated Palestinian had planned to carry out an unspecified attack “in the immediate future.”[48] Shin Bet took custody of the suspect.[49]

Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that Israeli settler attacks on Palestinians in the West Bank increased in 2023 to their highest level since the United Nations (UN) began recording data in 2006.[50] The UN documented over 700 Israeli settler attacks on Palestinians in the West Bank between October 7, 2023, and April 3, 2024.[51] HRW reported that the Israeli military did not protect Palestinians from settler violence and on some occasions participated in the attacks.[52]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
• Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
• Expel the United States from Syria

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least nine attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on April 17.[53] Hezbollah published a video on April 18 showing Hezbollah fighters launching an anti-tank guided missile on April 17 that destroyed an IDF counter-battery radar on Mount Meron.[54] The IDF base on Mount Meron hosts air traffic control, radar, surveillance, communication, and jamming facilities.[55] Counter-battery radars detect incoming indirect fire to ascertain the indirect fire’s point of origin. This information allows friendly forces to then engage the enemy artillery battery. Hezbollah’s first attack targeting Meron on January 6 damaged the bases’ radar domes.[56] Hezbollah has attacked Meron seven times in 2024.[57] Hezbollah has conducted several attacks targeting Israeli defenses along the northern Israeli border, including air defense sites, likely to degrade Israeli defenses.[58]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

An unnamed senior US official told ABC News on April 17 that Israel is unlikely to retaliate against Iran until after the Passover holiday.[59] The Jewish holiday Passover concludes at sundown on April 30. The US official added that several senior political and IRGC officials in Iran are in a state of high alert in “safe houses and underground facilities” in preparation for a potential Israeli response.

Bloomberg reported on April 18 that the IRGC intelligence gathering ship, the Behshad, left the Red Sea on April 4 to return to Iran.[60] The Behshad is expected to reach Iran’s Bandar Abbas port on April 18. The Behshad provides the Houthi movement with real-time intelligence, enabling them to target ships that have gone silent.[61] Western and Israeli media speculated that Israel may target the Behshad in its retaliatory strike against Iran’s drone and missile attack against Israel on April 13.[62]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian travelled to New York on April 17.[63] Abdollahian is scheduled to attend the United Nations Security Council meeting in New York on the Israel-Hamas war and meet with the United National Secretary General Antonio Guterres.

The United States Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated sixteen individuals and two entities on April 18 affiliated with Iran’s unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) production.[64] Some of the sanctioned entities and individuals are involved with producing engines for Iran’s Shahed-131 and Shahed-136 one-way attack drones. OFAC stated that Iran used these UAVs to target major civilian population centers on April 13 in Israel.[65] Russia has also used these systems in strikes against Ukrainian civilians and civilian infrastructure.

Two hashtags denouncing regime violence against women were trending on Twitter in Iran on April 18.[66] This came in the context of the Iranian Law Enforcement Command’s decision to resume the enforcement of mandatory veiling throughout Tehran on April 13.[67]

The Iraqi government and private sector signed 14 memoranda of understanding (MOU), primarily in energy and finance, with US companies on April 18.[68] The Iraqi Ministry of Electricity and Oil signed four separate MOUs with the General Electric Company and the Hanwell Company for oil field and “energy sector” development. Unspecified private Iraqi companies signed ten additional energy sector-related MOUs with US energy and engineering companies. The Iraqi National Bank signed a separate MOU with the American International Development Finance Corporation.

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani visited Washington, DC for a series of meetings with US officials, including US President Joe Biden, to discuss the US-Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement and expanding economic, environmental, and energy cooperation.[69]

Sudani also discussed F-16 maintenance and the purchase of spare parts during a meeting with Lockheed Martin on April 18.[70] Sudani stated that the maintenance of Iraqi F-16 aircraft is critical for Iraqi national security needs. Lockheed Martin removed F-16 aircraft maintenance crews from Iraq in 2021 due to Iranian-backed militia attacks on US bases, where the crew worked.[71] These are the same Iranian-backed militias that have conducted over 190 attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria between October 2023 and February 2024 as part of a political and military campaign to remove US forces from Iraq.[72]

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[1] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/662198/; https://en.mehrnews dot com/news/214062/

[2] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/662198/

[3] https://www.jpost dot com/middle-east/iran-news/iaea-chief-worried-israel-could-strike-iran-nuclear-facilities-797314

[4] https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/170648/; https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/662198/; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/en/news/2024/04/18/3070966/; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/01/30/3070908/; https://farsnews dot ir/Qaysar/1713447814430542974/; https://en.mehrnews dot com/news/214062/; https://www.mashreghnews dot ir/news/1594859/

[5] https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/irans-nuclear-challenge-and-military-option-nonproliferation-precedents-and-case ; https://www.armscontrol.org/blog/2024-04-15/retaliation-against-iranian-nuclear-sites-counterproductive; https://thebulletin.org/2024/04/the-enormous-risks-and-uncertain-benefits-of-an-israeli-strike-against-irans-nuclear-facilities/

[6] https://carnegieendowment.org/2005/03/23/for-tehran-nuclear-program-is-matter-of-national-pride-pub-16694; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/for-iranians-nuclear-program-is-a-glowing-source-of-pride/

[7] https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2023/jun/12/supreme-leader-nuclear-weapons-diplomacy ; https://foreignpolicy dot com/2014/10/16/when-the-ayatollah-said-no-to-nukes/

[8] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-december-29-2023

[9] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-14-2024

[10] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/01/20/israel-economy-red-sea-houthis/ ; https://www dot calcalistech.com/ctechnews/article/hpuk8j79d

[11] https://twitter.com/army21ye/status/1776959809314574506/photo/2

[12] https://twitter.com/army21ye/status/1764697397601423746

[13] https://twitter.com/army21ye/status/1768615408066535687 ; https://twitter.com/MMY1444/status/1768759238489231502

[14] https://www.maersk.com/news/articles/2023/12/15/maersk-operations-through-red-sea-gulf-of-aden

[15] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/01/20/israel-economy-red-sea-houthis/ ; https://www dot calcalistech.com/ctechnews/article/hpuk8j79d

[16] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1780845588004614297; https://twitter.com/manniefabian/status/1780846803157393663

[17] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1780845531767447739; https://twitter.com/manniefabian/status/1780846803157393663

[18] https://ecfr.eu/special/mapping_palestinian_politics/internal_security_force/

[19] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-25-2024

[20] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-17-2024

[21] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1897; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6277

[22] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1898; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1899

[23] https://t.me/alwya2000/6212

[24] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-11-2024; https://www.idf dot il/193048

[25] https://www.idf dot il/193048

[26] https://twitter.com/manniefabian/status/1780959369124815142

[27] https://t.me/AymanGouda/6114

[28] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1780845585714585861

[29] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1780845589699170724

[30] https://www.axios.com/2024/04/18/us-israel-gaza-rafah-offensive

[31] https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/politics/%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A-%D8%A5%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D8%B4%D8%A3%D9%86-%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%AD-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AD-%D9%85%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%84-%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%AF-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86

[32] https://www.axios.com/2024/04/18/us-israel-gaza-rafah-offensive

[33] https://www.axios.com/2024/04/18/us-israel-gaza-rafah-offensive

[34] https://asharq dot com/politics/85619/%D8%A3%D8%A8%D9%88-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%B2%D9%88%D9%82-%D9%84%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B2%D9%84-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D9%88%D9%82%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%88%D8%B6%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%84%D9%85-%D8%AA%D8%B5%D9%84-%D8%B7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%82-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%AF/

; https://www.jpost dot com/breaking-news/article-797721

[35] https://asharq dot com/politics/85619/%D8%A3%D8%A8%D9%88-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%B2%D9%88%D9%82-%D9%84%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B2%D9%84-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D9%88%D9%82%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%88%D8%B6%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%84%D9%85-%D8%AA%D8%B5%D9%84-%D8%B7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%82-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%AF/

[36] https://t.me/hamasps/19999%C2%A0; https://twitter.com/manniefabian/status/1779249179723780169

[37] https://twitter.com/BarakRavid/status/1779919967023976548

[38] https://twitter.com/BarakRavid/status/1779919967023976548

[39] https://twitter.com/WFP/status/1780883847837581330; https://www.cnn.com/middleeast/live-news/israel-hamas-war-gaza-news-04-18-24/h_7555913110416341e22e1bb0a1348d06

[40] https://twitter.com/WFP/status/1780883847837581330

[41] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-to-allow-more-aid-into-gaza-after-biden-warning-over-u-s-support-49bc42e4?st=mmd1w62gjva63uu&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink; https://www.kan dot org.il/content/kan-news/politic/733928/

[42] https://t.me/sarayaps/17686

[43] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6278 ;

https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6280 ;

https://t.me/QudsN/395045 ;

https://t.me/QudsN/394983

[44] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6278;

https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6280

[45] https://t.me/QudsN/395045

[46] https://twitter.com/qudsn/status/1716369139365773807 ; https://t.me/s/areennabluss

[47] https://t.me/jeninqassamm/5980 ; https://t.me/jeninqassamm/5984 ; https://t.me/jeninqassamm/6014

[48] https://www.i24news dot tv/en/news/israel/defense/artc-israeli-forces-arrest-i-s-operative-planning-terror-attack

[49] https://twitter.com/manniefabian/status/1780869998967132377

[50] https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/04/17/west-bank-israel-responsible-rising-settler-violence

[51] https://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-149

[52] https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/04/17/west-bank-israel-responsible-rising-settler-violence

[53] https://t.me/mmirleb/3338 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/3342 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/3344 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/3346 ; https://t.me/C_Military1/48931 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/3353 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/3355 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/3362 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/3363

[54] https://t.me/C_Military1/48965

[55] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-23-2024

[56] https://t.me/C_Military1/43454

[57] https://t.me/C_Military1/43454 ; https://t.me/C_Military1/43404 ; https://t.me/C_Military1/44576 ; https://t.me/C_Military1/45484 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/2296 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/2527 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/2862 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/3323

[58] https://t.me/C_Military1/44683 ; https://t.me/C_Military1/47572 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/3255 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/3286

[59] https://abcnews.go.com/International/live-updates/israel-gaza-hamas-war/israel-not-likely-to-carry-out-strike-until-after-passover-us-official-109365917?id=108860743

[60] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-04-18/iran-behshad-ship-linked-to-houthi-red-sea-attacks-comes-home

[61] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-february-16-2024#_edn02827b3321c14ddcdaf4ac824124a6dd59 ; https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iranian-spy-ship-helps-houthis-direct-attacks-on-red-sea-vessels-d6f7fd40 ;

[62] https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/iran-spy-ship-mv-behshad-sails-home-israel-attack-threats-rcna148368 ; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/suspected-iranian-spy-ship-returns-to-port-amid-concerns-of-potential-israeli-strike-report/ ; https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/hjvrsy0gc

[63] https://twitter.com/JasonMBrodsky/status/1780787186754834728 ; https://mfa dot ir/portal/NewsView/743787

[64] https://www.reuters.com/world/us-announces-new-sanctions-iran-after-missile-drone-strike-israel-2024-04-18/ ; https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2270

[65] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2270

[66] https://twitter.com/mh_rahbari1/status/1780664091771605054

[67] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-15-2024 ; https://www.entekhab dot ir/fa/news/775776/

[68] https://twitter.com/IraqiPMO/status/1780848874413842536

[69] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/04/15/joint-statement-from-the-leaders-of-the-united-states-and-the-republic-of-iraq/#:~:text=Today%2C%20the%20President,stability%2C%20and%20seurity

[70] https://twitter.com/IraqiPMO/status/1780937729959719167

[71] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/lockheed-martin-removes-contractors-iraq-base-over-security-fears-sources-2021-05-10/

[72] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-5-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-10-2024

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 18, 2024

Christina Harward, Riley Bailey, Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, and Frederick W. Kagan

April 18, 2024, 5:45pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on April 18. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 19 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov specified that Russian offensive effort that Ukrainian officials have been forecasting will likely begin in June 2024. Budanov stated in an April 17 article in the Washington Post that Russia will launch a “big” offensive in June 2024 with the aim of seizing all of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts.[1] Budanov also stated that Russian forces will try to make battlefield gains throughout 2024 as part of efforts to influence Western decision-making. Budanov had previously forecasted that a future major Russian offensive would begin in late May or early June 2024, and it is notable that Budanov has now narrowed his forecast to June and identified the likely aim of the Russian offensive. Previous major Russian offensive efforts have similarly aimed to seize the remainder of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.[2] Ukrainian officials, including Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, have recently warned about the threat of a potential future Russian ground offensive operation targeting Kharkiv City.[3] Ukrainian officials have repeatedly warned that US security assistance is vital to Ukraine’s ability to defend against possible future Russian offensive operations in summer 2024.[4] ISW continues to assess that current Ukrainian artillery and air defense shortages resulting from the lack of US security assistance are allowing Russian forces to make marginal tactical advances and that future Russian assaults may be able to achieve more significant gains should the US continue to withhold assistance to Ukraine.[5] Ukrainian forces have, however, previously demonstrated their ability to repel Russian assaults and inflict significant personnel and equipment losses on Russian forces when adequately provisioned.[6]

Budanov also stated on April 17 that Ukraine plans to counter future Russian offensive operations by continuing strikes against Russian military targets within Russia. Budanov stated in his interview with the Washington Post that the GUR plans to strike Russian defense industrial base (DIB) and critical military targets, such as airfields and command and control posts, in response to Russia’s forecasted summer 2024 offensive.[7] Budanov stated that these strikes are intended to show that Russian President Vladimir Putin cannot “protect the [Russian] population from the war.” ISW continues to assess that Ukrainian strikes against targets within Russia are an appropriate component of Ukraine’s campaign to degrade industries that support the Russian war effort and military capabilities deployed in the Russian rear.[8] Recent Ukrainian strikes that have targeted Russian military infrastructure within Russia, threatened Russian oil refining and exports, and increased pressure on Russia’s air defense umbrella have demonstrated that Ukraine can achieve some asymmetrical impacts through strikes with limited numbers of mostly domestically produced weapons.[9]

Russian forces reportedly continue to intensify crypto-mobilization efforts ahead of the expected Russian summer 2024 offensive operation but will likely struggle to establish effective operational- and strategic-level reserves rapidly. Bloomberg reported on April 18 that three sources familiar with the Kremlin’s force-generation discussions stated that the Kremlin is intensifying crypto-mobilization efforts in order to avoid conducting another partial mobilization call-up of reservists.[10] Ruslan Pukhov, the head of the Moscow-based Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies and a member of a Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) civilian advisory board, claimed that current Russian crypto-mobilization efforts are generating roughly 30,000 new personnel each month and that the Russian military could recruit 300,000 total personnel in 2024.[11] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi reported on January 15 that Russia recruits around 30,000 personnel per month, and Pukhov’s claim about 300,000 total recruits matches Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s April 3 warning that Russia is preparing to “mobilize” an additional 300,000 personnel on June 1.[12] Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on March 22 that high-ranking sources in the Russian MoD, presidential administration, and regional governments similarly stated that Russia may intend to generate an additional 300,000 personnel within an unspecified time frame.[13] Bloomberg noted that Russian regional one-time payments for signing a contract have increased by 40 percent to an average of 470,000 rubles ($4,992), and a Russian insider source claimed that some Russian authorities are offering one million rubles ($10,622) for people to sign military contracts.[14] Russian officials are reportedly concerned about decreasing recruitment rates and may intend to make economic incentives a cornerstone of crypto-mobilization efforts in spring and summer 2024.[15] The Russian MoD claimed on April 3 that more than 100,000 Russians had signed military service contracts since the start of 2024, but intensified Russian crypto-mobilization efforts are highly unlikely to generate an additional 200,000 personnel ahead of the expected Russian offensive effort in summer 2024.[16]

The Russian military has been generating forces at rates equal to its losses in Ukraine in recent months, and intensified monthly recruitment rates are unlikely to generate a considerable surplus of manpower for Russian operational- and strategic-level reserves.[17] Russian forces have maintained and even intensified offensive operations this spring, and these offensive operations will continue to consume a significant amount of manpower that could otherwise be used to form reserves as long as Russian forces sustain their current offensive tempo.[18] Russian forces are therefore unlikely to establish extensive reserves ahead of their expected summer 2024 offensive effort. The limited remaining time for Russian forces to prepare for the expected summer offensive effort will likely mean that any additional manpower added to reserves in the coming months will be poorly trained and less combat effective. The Russian insider source bemoaned poor Russian training capacity and claimed that some Russian volunteer formations are abandoning ranks altogether for new personnel due to the lack of proper training.[19] ISW continues to assess that planned Russian operational- and strategic-level reserves are unlikely to be ready to act as a first-echelon penetration force or as a second-echelon exploitation force capable of conducting large-scale assaults in 2024 if Ukrainian forces have the wherewithal to resist them.[20] Russian forces are more likely to use these reserves as they have previously done — as immediately available manpower pools for restaffing and reinforcing committed units conducting grinding, infantry-heavy assaults with occasional limited mechanized assaults.[21]

Ukrainian officials clarified that the Ukrainian strike on a Russian military airfield in occupied Dzhankoi, Crimea overnight on April 16 to 17 caused significant damage to Russian air defense equipment. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky confirmed on April 17 that Ukrainian forces conducted a successful strike against the Russian airfield in Dzhankoi.[22] Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on April 18 that the strike destroyed or critically damaged four S-400 air defense launchers, three radar stations, an air defense equipment control point, and a Murom-M airspace surveillance system.[23]

Russian milbloggers seized on a violent crime committed by a migrant in Moscow on April 18 to reiterate calls for further restrictions in Russian migration policies. Russian news outlet Mash reported on April 18 that an Azeri migrant killed a Russian man in Moscow and fled the scene.[24] Russian milbloggers largely responded to the murder by calling on Russian authorities to further restrict Russia’s migration policies and extend punishments for crimes committed by migrants.[25] Russian milbloggers warned that if the Russian government fails to respond to violence committed by migrants, Russians will be forced to “take matters into their own hands.”[26] Kremlin newswire TASS notably avoided framing the crime as an ethnic issue until Russian authorities publicly identified the suspect as a migrant from Azerbaijan.[27] Russian ultranationalists intensified their calls for revised and further restricted migration legislation following the March 22 Crocus City Hall attack, and several Russian officials, including Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev and Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin, have recently contradicted Russian President Vladimir Putin’s apparent efforts to quell anti-migrant sentiments among Putin’s ultranationalist constituency.[28] Putin’s competing efforts of placating ultranationalist anti-migrant demands and maintaining Russia’s war effort and economic viability will likely continue to generate inconsistencies and contradictions within the Kremlin’s migration policy and rhetoric.

The Russian government may be responding to Russian ultranationalist’ demands for stricter migrant policies in a limited fashion. Russian news outlet RBK reported on April 18 that the Russian Federal Service for Supervision in Education and Science (Rosobrnadzor) is considering implementing an oral Russian language exam for migrant workers and increasing the minimum Russian language, history, and law exam score for foreigners interested in a Russian residence permit or Russian citizenship.[29] Rosobrnadzor stated that migrants are currently allowed into Russia without taking an oral language exam. Russian Education and Science Minister Valery Falkov announced that only one Russian state university per federal subject will be allowed to administer Russian language, history, and law exams to migrants as of May 1, 2024 in an effort to “strengthen control over the quality of the exam.”[30] The Kremlin may be willing to introduce these limited measures in hopes of appeasing Russian ultranationalist demands, but ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is unlikely to implement any anti-migrant measures that could significantly hinder Russia’s ongoing force generation efforts or worsen Russia’s labor shortages.[31]

German authorities detained two individuals suspected of aiding Russia in its ongoing efforts to sabotage NATO member states’ military infrastructure and logistics. German outlet Der Spiegel reported on April 18 that German authorities arrested two suspects in Bayreuth, Bavaria for allegedly planning sabotage operations in Germany on behalf of Russian security services.[32] German investigators reportedly found that the suspects agreed to conduct arson and plant explosives at German military infrastructure facilities, weapons factories, and industrial sites, with a focus on routes used to transport military goods, in order to undermine German military assistance to Ukraine. The investigation also reportedly found that one of the suspects conducted reconnaissance for Russian intelligence services of US military facilities in Germany, including an area where the US military trains Ukrainian soldiers in Bavaria. Der Speigel reported that one of the suspects previously served in the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) People’s Militia between 2014 and 2016. German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock summoned the Russian ambassador to Germany on April 18 in response to the arrests.[33] The Russian Embassy in Germany denied the allegations, claiming that German authorities presented “no evidence” about the suspects’ connections with Russian security services and that the arrests were an “outright provocation.” The Russian embassy also used the incident to further multiple Kremlin narratives against the West aimed at deterring Western military assistance to Ukraine. ISW has observed reports of Russian efforts to degrade NATO member states’ transport logistics since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, including through cyber-attacks against Czech, Latvia, Lithuanian, Romanian, and Estonian railway companies.[34]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov specified that Russian offensive effort that Ukrainian officials have been forecasting will likely begin in June 2024.
• Budanov also stated on April 17 that Ukraine plans to counter future Russian offensive operations by continuing strikes against Russian military targets within Russia.
• Russian forces reportedly continue to intensify crypto-mobilization efforts ahead of the expected Russian summer 2024 offensive operation but will likely struggle to establish effective operational- and strategic-level reserves rapidly.
• Ukrainian officials clarified that the Ukrainian strike on a Russian military airfield in occupied Dzhankoi, Crimea overnight on April 16 to 17 caused significant damage to Russian air defense equipment.
• Russian milbloggers seized on a violent crime committed by a migrant in Moscow on April 18 to reiterate calls for further restrictions in Russian migration policies.
• German authorities detained two individuals suspected of aiding Russia in its ongoing efforts to sabotage NATO member states’ military infrastructure and logistics.
• Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Avdiivka and Donetsk City.
• Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s (RFE/RL) “Schemes” investigative project, citing Ukrainian intelligence, reported on April 17 that Russia’s defense industry is using US- and Japanese-made components in the navigation and communication systems of Russian Sukhoi fixed wing aircraft.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Positional fighting continued along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on April 18. Positional fighting continued southwest of Svatove near Serhiivka; northwest of Kreminna near Nevske: west of Kreminna near Terny and Yampolivka; and south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka.[35] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful squad-sized mechanized assaults near Yampolivka and Terny.[36] Elements of the Russian 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People’s Republic [LNR] Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating near Bilohorivka.[37]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Limited positional fighting continued northeast of Bakhmut near Siversk on April 18, but there were no changes to the frontline in this area. Positional fighting continued northeast of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske; south of Siversk near Rozdolivka; and southeast of Siversk near Vyimka.[38]

Russian forces reportedly advanced to a section of the eastern bank of the Siverskyi-Donets Donbas Canal east of Chasiv Yar amid continued fighting on April 18. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced up to a small section of the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas Canal southwest of Chasiv Yar on April 17, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[39] ISW has not observed any indications that Russian forces have crossed the canal in this area. Fighting continued northeast of Chasiv Yar near Bohdanivka; east of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske; near the Kanal Microraion (easternmost Chasiv Yar) and Novyi Microraion (southeastern most Chasiv Yar); and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Klishchiivka.[40] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are conducting heavy glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian positions and ammunition depots in and around Chasiv Yar, and a milblogger posted footage purporting to show a Russian Su-25 jet conducting strikes in support of elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division fighting near Chasiv Yar.[41]

Russian forces made relatively significant tactical advances northwest of Avdiivka, reaching the outskirts of Ocheretyne and entering Kalynove, and Ukrainian forces recaptured some positions in the area as of April 18. Geolocated footage published on April 18 shows that Russian forces advanced roughly three kilometers along a railway line up to the southeastern outskirts of Ocheretyne, and a Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces rapidly advanced after pushing Ukrainian forces from positions in the dacha area southeast of Ocheretyne.[42] Additional geolocated footage published on April 18 shows that Russian forces entered southeastern Novokalynove (northwest of Avdiivka and east of Ocheretyne) and that Ukrainian forces recaptured limited positions in western Berdychi (northwest of Avdiivka and southwest of Ocheretyne).[43] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces entered Ocheretyne, made additional advances south and southwest of Novokalynove, and approached closer to Umanske and Netaylove (west of Avdiivka), but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.[44] A milblogger claimed that Russian forces were able to make these advances because Russian forces had contained Ukrainian forces counterattacking near Berdychi.[45] Positional fighting also continued northwest of Avdiivka near Novobakhmutivka; west of Avdiivka near Semenivka and Yasnobrodivka; and southwest of Avdiivka near Nevelske and Pervomaiske.[46]

More aggressive Russian tactics are reportedly facilitating attritional Russian gains towards Chasiv Yar and around Avdiivka amid degraded Ukrainian defensive capabilities.[47] A Russian Storm-Z instructor claimed that Russian forces made gains first in Avdiivka, then towards Chasiv Yar, and now towards Ocheretyne by conducting “risky” operations — attritional, frontal assaults in conjunction with heavy artillery and airstrikes without first advancing on the flanks. The Storm-Z instructor noted that Russian forces conducted containing operations on the flanks of Ocheretyne by pinning Ukrainian forces near Berdychi, Novokalynove, and Keramik to enable a relatively rapid advance towards Ocheretyne but characterized the high Russian casualties in these operations as a “fact” of the battlefield. The Storm-Z instructor’s discussion is consistent with ISW’s observations of Russian tactics. The instructor’s discussion is emblematic of Russian forces’ ability to achieve relatively quick tactical gains more consistently and in more areas of the frontline without improving ground operations due to Ukrainian forces’ degraded defensive abilities from weapons and ammunition shortages.

Russian forces reportedly recently advanced southwest of Donetsk City amid continued positional fighting on April 18. A milblogger claimed on April 17 that Russian forces advanced west of Solodke (southwest of Donetsk City) towards Vuhledar, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[48] Positional fighting continued west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Pobieda, Novomykhailivka, and Vodyane (northeast of Vuhledar) on April 18.[49]

Positional fighting continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area near Urozhaine and Staromayorske (both south of Velyka Novosilka) on April 18.[50]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Positional engagements continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on April 18, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Positional engagements continued near Robotyne, Verbove (east of Robotyne), and Mala Tokmachka (northeast of Robotyne).[51] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces marginally advanced up to 400 meters in Robotyne, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[52] Elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division, including its 56th VDV Regiment, are reportedly operating near Robotyne and Verbove.[53]

Positional engagements continued near Krynky in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast on April 18.[54]

Ukrainian officials indicated that Ukrainian strikes continue to degrade the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s (BSF) ability to operate in the Black Sea. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukrainian intelligence reports indicate that Russia is moving its Kalibr missile-equipped ships from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea following Ukrainian strikes.[55] Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk stated that the BSF only has three out of six Kalibr-equipped submarines left in service and that submarines cannot operate in the northern Black Sea due to the shallow water.[56]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces launched a limited series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of April 17 to 18 and during the day on April 18. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 13 Shahed-136/131 drones from Primorsko-Akhartsk, Krasnodar Krai and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea and that Ukrainian forces shot down all the drones.[57] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces struck the Pokrovsk Machine Building Plant and a military equipment repair site in Pokrovsk, Donetsk City with unspecified missiles overnight.[58]Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Military Administration Head Serhiy Lysak reported on April 18 that Russian forces struck Dnipropetrovsk Oblast with two unspecified missiles and damaged an infrastructure facility and an unspecified enterprise.[59] Geolocated footage published on April 18 shows Russian strikes near Liubymivka, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[60] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces struck an S-300 missile system near Liubymivka and two or three MiG-29 aircraft at the Aviatorske airfield south of Dnipro City.[61] The Ukrainian Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor’s Office stated on April 18 that Russian forces likely used an S-300 missile to strike Sorokivka, Kharkiv Oblast in the afternoon.[62]

Ukrainian monitoring group Monitor stated on April 18 that Russian forces have accumulated about 2,530 thermobaric ODAB-500 and high-explosive fragmentation OFAB-500 bombs in frontline storage facilities in Ukraine.[63]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s (RFE/RL) “Schemes” investigative project, citing Ukrainian intelligence, reported on April 17 that Russia’s defense industry is using US- and Japanese-made components in the navigation and communication systems of Russian Sukhoi fixed wing aircraft.[64] Ukrainian intelligence provided Schemes with a list of more than 2,000 US- and Japanese-made components that Russian companies use to construct and maintain Russia Su-27SM3, Su-30SM, Su-34, Su-35S, and Su-57 aircraft and Schemes reported that Russian companies are importing the US- and Japanese-made components via intermediary companies mainly in Hong Kong, Turkey, China, and Hungary. Bloomberg reported on April 12 that Russia continues to rely on Chinese companies to supply most foreign-made machine tool components and microelectronics to Russia’s defense industry for Russian weapons production.[65]

The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) reported on April 18 that Russian forces have likely improved the infrastructure at the port of Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai to accommodate the redeployment of the majority of the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s (BSF) naval assets away from its main base in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea.[66] The UK MoD published satellite imagery dated April 1and reported that Russian forces recently inspected and reloaded an unspecified Russian Grigorovich-class guided missile frigate at the Novorossiysk port, which is significant because the Grigorovich-class frigate has a vertical launch system that Russian forces could previously only reload in Sevastopol. The UK MoD suggested that Russian forces’ ability to reload a Grigorovich-class frigate in Novorossiysk indicates that Russia has likely improved the port’s infrastructure to support the redeployment of BSF assets indefinitely. ISW continues to assess that the successful Ukrainian strike campaign against BSF infrastructure and assets in occupied Crimea has forced Russia to redeploy the majority of its naval assets away from occupied Crimea to Novorossiysk.[67]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Nothing significant to report.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Kremlin officials continue to deliver rhetoric aimed at weakening US support for Ukraine and promoting American and Western self-deterrence. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitri Peskov stated on April 18 that US security assistance will not influence the outcome of the situation on the frontline in Ukraine.[68] Peskov is likely attempting to influence internal US debates ahead of the US House of Representatives’ vote on a supplemental military assistance package for Ukraine on April 20.[69] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova promoted several longstanding accusations against Ukraine alleging Ukrainian violations of human rights and escalatory actions against Russia in an effort to degrade Western support for Ukraine.[70] Zakharova also accused the West of facilitating Ukraine’s alleged escalatory acts against Russia as part of an overarching Kremlin information operation that seeks to prompt the West into self-deterrence by threatening possible escalation between the West and Russia.[71]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

---

[1] https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/04/17/kyrylo-budanov-ukraine-general-russia-war-attacks/

[2] https://isw.pub/UkrWar013024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-11 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin%E2%80%99s-pyrrhic-victory-bakhmut-retrospective-battle-bakhmut

[3] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041024

[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041524

[5] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041324

[6] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041324

[7] https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/04/17/kyrylo-budanov-ukraine-general-russia-war-attacks/

[8] https://isw.pub/UkrWar040524

[9] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032024

[10] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-04-18/war-in-ukraine-russia-to-enlist-more-hired-soldiers-to-avoid-conscription?srnd=homepage-europe

[11] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-04-18/war-in-ukraine-russia-to-enlist-more-hired-soldiers-to-avoid-conscription?srnd=homepage-europe

[12] https://suspilne dot media/720194-rosia-gotue-na-1-cervna-mobilizaciu-300-tisac-vijskovih-zelenskij/ ; https://t.me/RBC_ua_news/90296 ; https://www.rbc dot ua/ukr/news/vadim-skibitskiy-rosiyan-e-motivatsiya-voyuvati-1705266418.html

[13] https://verstka dot media/kak-vlasti-budut-prizyvat-rossiyan-v-voyska-dlia-nastupleniya-na-harkov

[14] https://t.me/arbat/1806 ; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-04-18/war-in-ukraine-russia-to-enlist-more-hired-soldiers-to-avoid-conscription?srnd=homepage-europe

[15] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032224

[16] https://t.me/mod_russia/37290

[17] https://isw.pub/UkrWar011524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar011124

[18] https://isw.pub/UkrWar040324

[19] https://t.me/arbat/1806

[20] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041324

[21] https://isw.pub/UkrWar011524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar011124

[22] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/10116

[23] https://t.me/DIUkraine/3714 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/04/18/operacziya-zsu-na-aerodromi-dzhankoya-znyshheno-systemy-s-400-rls-i-punkt-upravlinnya-zasobamy-ppo/ ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/04/18/genshtab-pokazav-raketnyj-udar-po-aerodromu-v-okupovanomu-krymu/

[24] https://t.me/breakingmash/53575?single ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/66360 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/244619 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/244645

[25] https://t.me/MedvedevVesti/17328 ; https://t.me/rybar/59267 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/19433 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/40316 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/15467 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/15476 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/16624 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/16627 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/40316

[26] https://t.me/notes_veterans/16624 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/16627 ; https://t.me/MedvedevVesti/17328 ; https://t.me/rybar/59267

[27] https://t.me/tass_agency/244619 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/244627; https://t.me/tass_agency/244622; https://t.me/tass_agency/244619; https://t.me/tass_agency/244614; https://t.me/tass_agency/244635 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/244645

[28] https://isw.pub/UkrWar040924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040424 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040224 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032824 ; https://t.me/rian_ru/241543

[29] https://www.rbc dot ru/society/18/04/2024/661fd3a49a7947ddc1d523e9?from=newsfeed

[30] https://t.me/minobrnaukiofficial/8188

[31] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040424 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar033024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032624

[32] https://www.spiegel dot de/politik/deutschland/generalbundesanwalt-ermittelt-zwei-mutmassliche-russische-saboteure-in-bayern-verhaftet-a-0115bebd-195a-41fb-83be-da8d642045cd

[33] https://t.me/tass_agency/244605 ; https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/18/world/europe/germany-russia-spying-arrests.html

[34] https://isw.pub/UkrWar040524

[35] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02RzEPqsVPWpXHvjieLK5uEsXCfr7Qx1ekYJEtnXroQZvH516vcgUrD5KxBRoonvPTl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid025J82Cki1fNT6ySDHUcFZnYcFesKyXJHKwayr75W6MSkbUgpgEHqD6AMPatPb48ial ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0NmvMgaT8zGKeyB9ZyNzCydkmDWoi9kTh7XEgE3fv3qF3ZfVKGAAaXgXPQq9hsBKFl ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/26536 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/21862 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/21871

[36] https://t.me/motopatriot/21884 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/21871

[37] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/120581 (Bilohorivka)

[38] https://t.me/dva_majors/40308

[39] https://t.me/rybar/59254

[40] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0NmvMgaT8zGKeyB9ZyNzCydkmDWoi9kTh7XEgE3fv3qF3ZfVKGAAaXgXPQq9hsBKFl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02RzEPqsVPWpXHvjieLK5uEsXCfr7Qx1ekYJEtnXroQZvH516vcgUrD5KxBRoonvPTl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid025J82Cki1fNT6ySDHUcFZnYcFesKyXJHKwayr75W6MSkbUgpgEHqD6AMPatPb48ial; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/9670; https://t.me/wargonzo/19424; https://t.me/motopatriot/21854; https://t.me/motopatriot/21862

[41] https://t.me/dva_majors/40329; https://t.me/Aviahub34/2353; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/66374; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/9670; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/9670; https://t.me/wargonzo/19424

[42] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5175; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/151; https://t.me/z_arhiv/26534; https://t.me/rybar/59272

[43] https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/7869; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/152; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5176; https://t.me/urga_74/348; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5182?single; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/120521; https://t.me/don_partizan/4725

[44] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/9676; https://t.me/rybar/59272; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/9692; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/66306; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/9692; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/66306; https://t.me/motopatriot/21854; https://t.me/motopatriot/21859; https://t.me/motopatriot/21869; https://t.me/dva_majors/40308;

[45] https://t.me/philologist_zov/920; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/9676; https://t.me/motopatriot/21895

[46] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/66326; https://t.me/motopatriot/21860; https://t.me/dva_majors/40308

[47] https://t.me/motopatriot/21862

[48] https://t.me/motopatriot/21854; https://t.me/motopatriot/21854

[49] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0NmvMgaT8zGKeyB9ZyNzCydkmDWoi9kTh7XEgE3fv3qF3ZfVKGAAaXgXPQq9hsBKFl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02RzEPqsVPWpXHvjieLK5uEsXCfr7Qx1ekYJEtnXroQZvH516vcgUrD5KxBRoonvPTl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid025J82Cki1fNT6ySDHUcFZnYcFesKyXJHKwayr75W6MSkbUgpgEHqD6AMPatPb48ial; https://t.me/mod_russia/37731

[50] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0NmvMgaT8zGKeyB9ZyNzCydkmDWoi9kTh7XEgE3fv3qF3ZfVKGAAaXgXPQq9hsBKFl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02RzEPqsVPWpXHvjieLK5uEsXCfr7Qx1ekYJEtnXroQZvH516vcgUrD5KxBRoonvPTl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid025J82Cki1fNT6ySDHUcFZnYcFesKyXJHKwayr75W6MSkbUgpgEHqD6AMPatPb48ial

[51] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0NmvMgaT8zGKeyB9ZyNzCydkmDWoi9kTh7XEgE3fv3qF3ZfVKGAAaXgXPQq9hsBKFl ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/8364 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37731 ; https://t.me/rybar/59254 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/19424 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/40308;

[52] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/9677 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/19424

[53] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/66335 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/120616

[54] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0NmvMgaT8zGKeyB9ZyNzCydkmDWoi9kTh7XEgE3fv3qF3ZfVKGAAaXgXPQq9hsBKFl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02RzEPqsVPWpXHvjieLK5uEsXCfr7Qx1ekYJEtnXroQZvH516vcgUrD5KxBRoonvPTl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid025J82Cki1fNT6ySDHUcFZnYcFesKyXJHKwayr75W6MSkbUgpgEHqD6AMPatPb48ial

[55] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/10120

[56] ttps://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/04/18/u-vms-zsu-povidomyly-skilky-pidvodnyh-nosiyiv-kalibriv-zalyshylosya-u-rf-v-chornomu-mori/

[57] https://t.me/kpszsu/13364

[58] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/9695 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/120604

[59] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/12186 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/12187

[60] https://x.com/clashreport/status/1781020192874873312; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1781026750584996283; https://t.me/DniproOfficial/3138; https://twitter.com/VigorousFalcon/status/1781023516730810425

[61] https://t.me/fighter_bomber/16386

[62] https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/15313

[63] https://twitter.com/war_monitor_ua/status/1780912792385536150

[64] https://www.radiosvoboda dot org/a/skhemy-zakhidni-detali-dlya-rosiyskykh-litakiv-su/32909284.html

[65] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041324

[66] https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1780878487068242335

[67] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032424 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021424 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020124 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukrainian-strikes-have-changed-russian-naval-operations-black-sea ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/special-edition-campaign-assessment-ukraine%E2%80%99s-strike-campaign-against-crimea

[68] https://t.me/tass_agency/244597

[69] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-17-2024

[70] https://t.me/tass_agency/244581 ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/38801 ;

[71] https://isw.pub/UkrWar040424 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/244581 ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/38801 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/244589 ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/38801